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Constitutional Law-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS-PYRAMID SALES 
SCHEMES-REMAINING LIMITATIONS, IF ANY, ON THE POLICE POWER 
UNDER THE CONTRACT CLAUSE-KOSCO~ Interplanetary, Inc. v. 
Draney, 530 P.2d 108 (Nevi 1974). 
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. (Koscot) sold cosmetics in Ne- 
vada through the use of a "pyramid promotional scheme." In 
1971, Nevada enacted a statute, hereinafter referred to as chapter 
598, which prohibited all future pyramid schemes and made con- 
tracts entered into prior to the effective date of the statute voida- 
ble if the right to participate in a pyramid promotional scheme 
formed any part of the consideration.' Before chapter 598 became 
effective, plaintiffs contracted with Koscot for the right to partici- 
pate in a pyramid plan and paid Koscot the contract price. After 
the effective date of the Act, plaintiffs requested Koscot to refund 
their investment and, upon refusal, s;ed for rescission. 
The District Court for the Second Judicial District of Nevada 
found that  the contract was voidable under chapter 598 and 
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. Koscot appealed, 
claiming that the portion of chapter 598 making contracts entered 
into before the enactment of the statute voidable violated the 
contract clauses of the United States2 and Nevada  constitution^.^ 
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the statute was a legiti- 
mate use of the police power and was therefore valid even though 
contractual obligations were affected. 
A. Pyramid Sales Plans and the Legal Efforts to Control Them 
Pyramid sales organizations have been a source of contro- 
versy since the mid-1960'~.~ In a typical pyramid situation, a 
participant pays a substantial sum to obtain a company position 
and attempts to recover his investment through commissions 
1. NEV. REV. STAT. $ 5  598.100-.I30 (1973). 
2. U.S. CONST. art. 1, $ 10, provides: "No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, 
ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . ." 
3. NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 15, provides: " No . . . law impairing the obligation of 
contracts shall ever be passed. . . ." 
4. See Comment, Multi-Level or Pyramid Sales Systems: Fraud or Free Enterprise, 
18 S. DAK. L. REV. 358 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Multi-Level]. 
For additional information on pyramid schemes and comment on various suggested 
solutions to the pyramid contract problem see Comment, Federal Regulation of Pyramid 
Sales Schemes, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 137; Comment, Toward a Uniform Approach to Multi- 
level Distributorships, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 546 (1975); and Note, Regulation of Pyramid 
Sales Ventures, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 117 (1973). 
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from product sales and from additional commissions received by 
enlisting others in the organization. This right to receive substan- 
tial commissions by persuading others to buy a company position 
distinguishes pyramid schemes from traditional marketing meth- 
ods and is often the most financially rewarding right gained from 
pyramid  contract^.^ 
The major source of fraud found in pyramid schemes is that 
returns on investment usually come from position-selling rather 
than from product sales. Often the market for the product cannot 
support the huge sales organization which develops, and those 
participating in the plan can make money only by enticing others 
to join. When new recruits are found, they then face the same 
problem previously faced by those who persuaded them to join: 
they cannot effectively sell the product and must therefore try to 
enlist others to recover their i n ~ e s t m e n t . ~  This fundamental 
weakness of endless-chain schemes is amplified by the tendency 
to misrepresent earnings in terms of what is remotely possible 
instead of informing prospects of what is actually earned in real- 
life situations.' 
Because pyramid plans have frequently been used as a vehi- 
cle for fraud, legislative and judicial reaction to these schemes 
has been swift. Many states have prohibited pyramid promo- 
tional schemes by name or through expanded consumer fraud 
statutes? A few states allow such schemes but strictly regulate 
them.g In the absence of legislation specifically aimed at pyramid 
contracts, courts have invalidated many such contracts on the 
grounds of fraud,1° restraint of trade," security registration viola- 
5. See Multi-Level, supra note 4, a t  359-67. 
6. Even if the product is marketable, recruits find it easier to find new recruits than 
to sell. Because of the principles of geometric progression and the incentive to get others 
to join, the market is easily saturated with'an over-abundance of sellers. As a matter of 
mathematical certainty, the plan will fail somewhere along the line unless participants 
expect income to come basically from product-selling. Id. a t  365-67. 
7. One commentator stated: "Because the 'plan' often looks better on paper than it 
works in practice, it lends itself to being manipulated by clever and sophisticated people 
. . . ."Id. at361. 
8. Id. a t  380 & n.133. 
9. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, 5 166 (Supp. 1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, 5 
69 (1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. 5 37-25-01 to -28 (1975). 
10. See, e.g., State ex rel. Turner v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 624 
(Iowa 1972); Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 293 A.2d 682 
(Super. Ct. 1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Speaker v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., Equity 
Docket No. 57 (C.P. Erie County Pa. 1970). 
11. See Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 293 A.2d 682 
(Super. Ct. 1972). Multi-Level, supra note 4, a t  372-74. 
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tions, l2  unconscionability, l 3  and as illegal lotteries. l4 
The Nevada statute contested in the present case, chapter 
598, differs from other legislation in this area in that it makes pre- 
legislation pyramid contracts voidable in addition to prohibiting 
future pyramid schemes. Legislation prohibiting future pyramid 
promotional schemes has been upheld.15 Prior to the present case, 
however, no statute making voidable pyrarnid-scheme contracts 
entered into and paid for before its passage. had yet been chal- 
lenged. 
B. T h e  Contract Clause 
1. Legislative history 
From the scant legislative history available, it appears that 
the contract clause of the federal Constitution was originally in- 
tended to have an effect in civil actions similar to that which the 
ex post facto provision has in criminal matters? On August 22, 
1787, the Constitutional Convention adopted a provision forbid- 
ding Congress, the national legislature, from enacting any ex post 
' facto law.I7 Six days later, on August 28th, Rufus King moved to 
add a provision prohibiting the states from interfering "in private 
contracts."lR Many delegates opposed the proposal, fearing that 
such a far-reaching clause would excessively hinder state legisla- 
tures. Proponents assured the critics that King's provision pro- 
hibited only retrospective interferences.lg Nevertheless, the dele- 
12. See, e.g., Hurst v. Dare to be Great, Inc., 474 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1973); Frye v. 
Taylor, 263 S.W.2d 835 (Fla. App. 1972); State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 
642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971); State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business System, Inc., 5 Ore. 
App. 284, 482 P.2d 549 (1971); State ex rel. Park and McEldowney v. Glen Turner Enter- 
prises, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. fi 71,023 (4th Dist. Ct. Idaho 1972). 
Not all courts, however, have defined "investment contract" to include pyramid 
contracts and have held the security requirements to be inapplicable. See, e.g., Koscot 
Interplanetary, Inc., v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). See generally Multi- 
Level, supra note 4, a t  375-78; Annot., 47 A.L.R.3rd 1366 (1973). 
13. See State ex rel. Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39,275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966). 
14. See, e.g., Frye v. Taylor, 263 So. 2d 835 (Fla. App. 1972); People ex rel. Kelley v. 
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 37 Mich. App. 447,195 N.W.2d 43 (1972); Multi-Level, supra 
note 4, at  370-72. 
15. See State ex rel. Sanborn v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 212 Kan. 668, 512 P.2d 
416 (1973). 
16. See B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 4-26 (1938) 
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]. 
17. Crosskey, The Ex-Post Facto and Contracts Clauses in the Federal Convention: 
A Note on the Editorial Ingenuity of James Madison, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 248, 248-49 (1968) 
[hereinafter cited as Crosskey]. 
18. Id. a t  248. 
19. WRIGHT, supra note 16, a t  9; Crosskey, supra note 17, at 248-49. 
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gates did not adopt King's motion a t  that time. Rather, they 
adopted a substitute motion by John Rutledge prohibiting the 
states from enacting ex post facto laws or, as recorded in Madi- 
son's notes, "retrospective laws."20 The following day, August 
29th, John Dickinson, according to some sources, advised the 
Conventionthat the term ex post facto was used at  common law 
only in criminal actions.21 The Convention responded with the 
contract clause; its purpose, under the most widely accepted 
view, was to insure that ex post facto concepts would be extended 
to civil matters.22 Significantly, this civil-criminal distinction was 
adopted in the 1798 case of Calder v. where the United 
States Supreme Court, at  least partially influenced by the as- 
sumption that the contract clause performed an equivalent func- 
tion in the civil area,24 limited the ex post facto clause to criminal 
matters. 
While the economic uncertainty and debtor relief measures 
prevalent prior to the Constitutional Convention have encour- 
aged speculation that the contract clause was inserted to promote 
economic stability, the records of the Convention provide little 
direct support for this position. The faint light shed by those 
20. WRIGHT, supra note 16, a t  9 & n.16. 
21. Id. a t  10 & n.21. 
Professor Crosskey, however, asserts that the incident involving John Dickinson prob- 
ably never occurred and that James Madison invented the episode in order to promote 
his personal beliefs concerning the role that the contract clause should play. Crosskey 
further argues that Madison consciously omitted key details and deliberately altered his 
records of the Convention in an effort to create the illusion that the contract clause was 
an extention of the ex post facto clause. See Crosskey, supra note 17, a t  248-54. 
22. See WRIGHT, supra note 16, at'4-16. 
If Professor Crosskey's position that Madison made misleading statements is ac- 
cepted, however, the idea that the contract clause was originally intended to apply ex post 
facto protections in limited civil areas is not as obvious (See note 21 supra). Nevertheless, 
the fact that proponents of the contract clause specifically told their critics that the clause 
would only prohibit retrospective interferences has not been challenged, and the response 
of those critics demonstrates that Madison's belief that the contract clause prohibited 
retrospective legislation was shared by others. See note 19 and accompanying text supra. 
Furthermore, given the confusion that existed concerning the scope of the ex post facto 
clause, Rutledge's substitute motion may have been intended to prohibit both civil and 
criminal ex post facto measures. See note 20 and accompanying text supra. 
23. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
24. The Court said: 
The restriction not to pass any ex post facto law was to secure the person of the 
subject from injury, or punishment in consequence of such law. If the prohibi- 
tion against making ex post facto laws was intended to secure personal rights 
from being affected, or injured, by such laws, . . . the other restraints 
[embodied in the contract clause] I have not enumerated, were unnecessary, 
and therefore improper, for both of them are retrospective. 
Id. a t  390 (emphasis in original). 
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records reveals only its relationship to the ex post facto clause25 
described above. Consequently, the development of the contract 
clause into "a mighty instrument for the protection of the rights 
of private property"26 was the result of judicial activism.27 
2. The contract clause and judicial activism 
The initial Supreme Court decisions concerning the contract 
clause extended the protections of the clause to grants,2R con- 
t r a c t ~ , ~ ~  and charters30 to which the state is a party, and demon- 
strated the judiciary's determination to preserve the sanctity of 
contracts. For example, in Fletcher v. P e ~ k , ~ '  the Court declared 
unconstitutional an act that revoked an earlier grant of land even 
though the initial grant was obtained through fraud and bribery. 
In New Jersey v. Wilson,32 the state was told that it could not 
revoke a contractually-incurred grant of perpetual tax immunity. 
This insistence that legislatures could not alter significant terms 
of contracts was most forceably declared in Sturges v. 
Cr~winshie ld ,~~ where Chief Justice Marshall declared that "the 
Convention appears to have intended to establish a great princi- 
ple that contracts should be in~o idab le , "~~  and held that state 
bankruptcy laws could not affect contractual debts incurred be- 
fore passage of the bankruptcy laws. 
3. Limitations on the scope of the contract clause 
Although these early cases conveyed the impression that con- 
tracts were virtually immune from legislative interference, limits 
25. WRIGHT, supra note 16, a t  8-18. 
26. Id. at  28. 
27. Id. at  27-61. 
28. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
29. New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812). 
30. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
31. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
32. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812). 
33. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). 
34. Id. a t  206. 
Marshall also described the purpose of the clause in the following forceful terms: 
So much mischief was done, and so much more was apprehended, that 
general distrust prevailed, and all confidence between man and man was de- 
stroyed . . . . 
To restore public confidence completely, it was necessary not only to pro- 
hibit the use of particular means by which it [economic mischief] might be 
effected, but to prohibit the use of any means by which the same mischief might 
be produced. 
Id. at  204, 206. 
286 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
to the power and scope of the contract clause gradually appeared. 
Initially, the Court distinguished between the "remedy" and 
"obligation" parts of the contract stating that reasonable altera- 
tions of available remedies were permissible if the "obligation is 
not substantially impaired."3J The impact of Sturges was further 
cushioned by the decision in Ogden v. Sa~nders,~%hich estab- 
lished the principle that the contract clause poses no barrier to 
laws which only affect contracts concluded after the legislature 
has acted. Later, in West River Bridge Co. v. Dix," the Court 
stated that the state's power of "eminent domain" is an "inalien- 
able state right" which can be exercised even though such exer- 
cise might affect contractual rights. Nevertheless, throughout 
most of the nineteenth century the courts, despite these early 
limitations, continued widespread use of the contract clause to 
invalidate state legi~la t ion.~~ 
As the "police power" concept gained in prominence, how- 
ever, the clout of the contract clause began to diminish. Because 
the states have an affirmative duty to promote the "health, 
safety, morals, and general welfare" of their citizens, it became 
apparent that the existence of a few contracts could not and 
should not prevent the state from enacting laws necessary to pre- 
vent future harm to its citizens.39 Initially, this "police power 
rationale" was used to uphold laws that prevented parties from 
fulfilling contractual obligations made illegal by subsequent leg- 
islation. For example, in Beer Co. v. Massachu~e t t s ,~~  the High 
Court upheld a state prohibition law intervening between crea- 
tion and execution of contracts for the sale of beer. Similarly, in 
Stone u.' Mi~siss ippi ,~~ legislation prohibiting lotteries was upheld 
even though previously-issued lottery tickets could not now be 
used. 
Modern decisions have relied upon the police power rationale 
to permit legislatures to further manipulate specific contractual 
35. This distinction mentioned in Sturges v. Crowninshield (id. a t  207) was elabo- 
rated in Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843), where the Court held that certain 
changes in the state's mortgage-foreclosure laws so changed the "remedy" that the entire 
"obligation" was impaired. 
36. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1819). 
37. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848). 
38. During the 19th century, the contract clause was used more than any other 
constitutional provision to invalidate state legislation. WRIGHT, supra note 16, at xii. 
39. See WRIGHT, supra note 16, a t  193-213; Hale, The Supreme Court and the Con- 
tract Clause: 11, 57 HARV. L. REV. 621, 654-63 (1944); Comment, The Continuing Vitality 
of the Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 576, 586-89 (1967). 
40. 97 U.S. 25 (1877). 
41. 101 U.S. 814 (1879). 
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terms. Foremost among these cases is Home Building and Loan 
Association v. B l a i ~ d e l l . ~ ~  In that  case, the Court upheld a law 
passed during the depression which prohibited mortgage foreclo- 
sures over a two-year period so long as the mortgagor paid rent, 
taxes, interest, and insurance during the extension period? Al- 
though the case could conceivably have been decided on the tra- 
ditional view that reasonable modifications of available remedies 
are permissible or on the basis that the state was exercising its 
6 6 emergency powers,"44 the decision rested upon the assertion that 
states can alter specific contractual provisions under the aegis of 
the police power." Nevertheless, while asserting broad state 
power to modify contracts, the opinion is also riddled with de- 
scriptions of the economic emergency facing the nation, illustra- 
tions of ways in which substitute provisions provided by the con- 
tested act adequately compensated and protected the mortgagee, 
and statements explaining that the police power could not be 
allowed to destroy the limitation against impairment of con- 
t r a c t ~ . ~ ~  As a result, one is left with the clear impression that this 
power to alter contractual terms is limited."' 
One limitation on the use of police power to modify or impair 
contracts is the requirement that legislation must actually pro- 
mote the  public welfare. In Treigle v. Acme Homestead 
Asso~iation,~Vhe United States Supreme Court found that the 
contested statute did not actually promote the public good but 
only changed the relative positions of the contracting parties vis- 
a-vis each other. The Court struck down the statute involved, 
holding that a contract-impairing statute must promote the pub- 
lic welfare and not simply the private welfare of one of the con- 
42. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
43. Id. 
44. See,  WRIGHT, supra note 16, a t  109-11; Comment, T h e  Continuing Vitality of  t h e  
Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution, 40 S .  CAL. L. REV. 576, 586-89 (1967). 
45. 290 U.S. a t  444. 
46. 290 U.S. 398, 415-48. 
The balance which needs to be struck is best illustrated in these words: 
The reserved power [police power] cannot be construed so as to destroy the 
limitation [against impairment of contracts], nor is the limitation to be con- 
strued to destroy the reserved power in its essential aspects. 
Id. at  439. 
47. Although Wright's conclusion that Blaisdell merely decided the "very narrow 
question of the validity of the particular statute under the specific circumstances then 
existing" is over simplistic, the Blaisdell opinion does indicate that there are definite 
limits placed upon the police power's ability to impair contractual obligations. See  
WRIGHT, supra note 16, a t  119. 
48. 297 U.S. 189 (1936). 
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tracting individuals." The Court then added that even if a 
contract-impairing law does promote the public good, the law 
must be "reasonable" and "reasonably adapted" to achieve the 
desired results before it can be found to be valid? 
Several post-Blaisdell cases indicate that statutory schemes 
which modify contractual obligations to a greater extent than 
necessary to achieve the legislative ends are "unreasonable" and 
therefore uncon~titutional.~~ In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank 
v. R a d f ~ r d , ~ ~  the Supreme Court refused to validate a mortgage- 
foreclosure moratorium similar to that upheld in Blaisdell simply 
because the provisions in the Blaisdell statute requiring payment 
of reasonable rent and taxes during the extension period were 
absent.53 In W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas,54 legislation passed 
during the Depression which exempted insurance policy benefit 
payments from garnishment was invalidated because no time 
limits were placed upon the act and because no attempt was 
made to differentiate between debtors who could afford to pay 
and those who could not.55 A similar result was reached in 
Worthen Co. v. K a ~ a n a u g h , ~ ~  where procedures used to protect 
property owners and to enforce bond payments were so substan- 
tially changed that the Court struck down the legislation as op- 
pressive and unne~essary.~' 
The most recent Supreme Court decision on the contract 
clause, City of El Paso v. S i r n m o n ~ , ~ ~  held that a law which sub- 
stituted a five-year right of redemption for an original grant of an 
49. Id., a t  195, 197. 
50. Id. a t  197. 
51. It is incorrect to assume that the only requirement for the validity of contract- 
impairing legislation is that it be rationally related to a public end. An examination of 
Blaisdell and post-Blaisdell cases indicates that legislation with a rational basis will, when 
a contract clause attack is mounted, receive close judicial scrutiny. Many laws that 
impaired the obligation of contracts more than necessary to achieve the desired public 
result have been held unconstitutional. Cf. WRIGHT, supra note 16, at 111-19. 
52. 295 U.S. 555 (1935). 
53. In his majority opinion, Justice Brandeis asserted that no substantive right was 
impaired in Blaisdell because of the compensatory provisions which the statute in that 
case provided. Absent those provisions, the statute in Radford impaired substantive 
rights. Id. a t  581. 
54. 292 U.S. 426 (1934). 
55. Id. a t  434. 
Distinguishing the Blaisdell case, Justice Hughes restated his opinion that the police 
power "must be construed in harmony with the fair intent of the constitutional limitation'' 
and that the police action "must be limited by reasonable conditions appropriate . . . to 
the exigency to which the legislation was addressed." Id. a t  433-34. 
56. 295 U.S. 56 (1935). 
57. Id. a t  60-63. 
58. 379 U S .  497 (1965). 
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unlimited right of redemption on land sold by the State of Texas 
over fifty years earlier was, in light of the circumstances, a valid 
and reasonable exercise of the police power. In upholding this 
change, the Court stressed the insignificance of the modification 
and noted that the reinstatement provisions were nonessential 
terms that did not induce the original investors to enter into the 
contract." The emphasis placed by the Court on the trivial nature 
of the modified terms has prompted suggestions that unless the 
legislation is of the type that makes contractually-obligated con- 
duct illegal, major contractual terms cannot be modified if ade- 
quate substitute provisions are absent? At the very least, the El 
Paso decision demonstrates that the public good to be accom- 
plished must be weighed against the contractual rights lost in 
determining a statute's "reas~nableness."~~ 
The Nevada Supreme Court relied heavily on the traditional 
"police power" analysis formulated in Home Building and Loan 
Association u. BlaisdelP2 to reach its conclusion that existing con- 
tracts could be invalidated by legislative action." The court 
briefly reviewed the methods used by the defendant in Nevada 
and concluded that the defendant's contracts and policies were 
"nothing but a fraudulent scheme."" The abuses found in the 
defendant's operations demonstrated the need for legislative pro- 
tection from such plans. After noting that the legislature has wide 
discretion in enacting laws and that such laws carry a presump- 
tion of validity," the court summarized its response to the con- 
tract clause challenge in these words: 
Although contracts previously entered into may be affected 
thereby, the constitutional interdiction against the impairment 
of the obligation of contracts does not prevent a state in the 
reasonable exercise of its police power from enacting laws in- 
tended to benefit the public.6fi 
-- - 
59. Id. a t  514, 516-17. 
60. See  Kraft & St. John, T h e  Contract Clause as the Guardian Against Legislative 
Impairment of Municipal Bondholders' Rights, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 48, 59 (1974). 
61. The tenor of the entire El Paso opinion suggests that the degree of public welfare, 
the importance of the term which is altered, and the availability of less onerous methods 
are all to be weighed to determine a statute's validity. See generally 379 U.S.  at 517-35 
(Black, J .  dissenting). 
62. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
63. 530 P.2d at  112-14. 
64. Id. a t  112. 
65. Id. a t  113. 
66. Id. 
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In response to the defendant's contention that the police 
power could only impair contracts in emergency situations not 
found in the present case, the court properly concluded that an 
emergency situation is not a prerequisite to the valid exercise of 
the police power. It then reiterated its belief that for a contract- 
impairing law to be valid it need only promote the public welfare, 
by stating that "where the police power is exercised 'for an end 
which is in fact public,' contracts must yield to the accomplish- 
ment of that end."67 Finally, the court concluded that regulation 
of pyramid sales contracts was an "end which is in fact public7' 
and that the entire statute was therefore va1idF 
A. The Court's Use of Prior Contract Clause Cases 
The historical development of the contract clause and the 
holdings of several post-Blaisdell decisions demonstrate that the 
power to modify contractual obligations is not unlimited. In 
reaching its conclusion that  making prelegislation contracts 
voidable was a legitimate use of the police power, however, the 
Nevada Supreme Court failed to wrestle with and apply limiting 
features of the contract clause that, given the facts of the instant 
case, ought to have been applied. This failure was due in part to 
the court's misplaced reliance on or misapplication of several 
prior contract clause cases. Before examining that particular dif- 
ficulty with the court's decision, however, an undoubtedly correct 
aspect of the decision merits comment. 
Certain provisions of chapter 598 prohibit future pyramid 
sales contracts." Those provisions must, however, significantly 
affect existing contracts, given the fact that the right to earn 
commissions from position-selling is the most important right of 
pyramid contracts. Nevertheless, the state's right to protect its 
citizens from the harm which it reasonably believes will occur 
from a continuation of pyramid-selling practices cannot be 
thwarted simply because the exercise of that right will, in the 
future, affect already-existing contracts. Indeed, the future- 
oriented provisions of chapter 598 are, in substance, analogous to 
the statute upheld in Beer Co. u. Massach~se t t s~~  that prohibited 
67. Id. a t  114, quoting Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936). 
68. 530 P.2d a t  114. 
69. NEV. REV. STAT. $ 5  598.110-.I30 (1973). 
70. 97 U.S. 25 (1877). 
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future sales of alcohol. Given the continuing validity of the Beer 
Co. case, the court's determination in the instant case that the 
similar provisions of chapter 598 are constitutional is sound. 
Other provisions of chapter 598 are aimed directly at  already- 
existing contracts and a t  past actions, in that prelegislation con- 
tracts may be voided by the purchaser. It was in that part of its 
decision upholding these provisions that the court misapplied 
precedent. The cases used by the court to support its holding 
dealt solely with statutes affecting or regulating contractual obli- 
gations that had not yet been performed. In effect, the court 
extended the police power rationale of those cases to permit retro- 
active invalidation of completed contractual transactions. But 
the United States Supreme Court, in its contract clause cases, 
has never upheld a statute prohibiting or altering contractual 
obligations that  the parties had performed. For example, 
Blaisdell did not concern mortgage foreclosures that had already 
occurred, but only prevented future foreclosures for a two-year 
period.71 Similarly, in Stone v. Mis~iss ippi ,~~ although future lot- 
teries were prohibited, the sellers of lottery tickets were not re- 
quired to return purchasers' money. 
Regarding the statutes upheld in prior cases against contract 
clause attacks, it may well be that, as a result of a statutory 
prohibition of future actions required by existing contracts, spe- 
cific contracts were voided by subsequent court action. But the 
purpose and the direct effect of the legislation reviewed in those 
cases was to protect the public from anticipated future harm. By 
contrast, that portion of chapter 598 that makes existing con- 
tracts voidable is designed to compensate for past ills incurred as 
a result of completed contractual performances. With respect to 
the scope given a state's police power, the present case thus goes 
further than other cases in the area.7"et, although expanding 
the police power to allow for the modification of executed contrac- 
71. Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
72. 101 U.S. 814 (1879). 
73. The word "retroactive" itself causes some confusion, because it is used in two 
different contexts in legal analysis. In one set of circumstances it refers to the effect of 
laws on events which have terminated before legislative action. In the second context, 
retroactive laws affect rights which were received in the past, but, in the absence of 
legislation, would not reach fruition for some time in the future. Both types of retroactive 
legislation have been disfavored, but,  as  has been shown, courts have allowed some retro- 
active legislation of this second type. See Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Consid- 
erations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CAL. L. REV. 216, 216-20 (1960). 
The present case involves the first type of retroactive legislation which has not re- 
ceived even the small amount of validity given to legislation of the second class. 
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tual provisions poses significant additional questions concerning 
existing limitations on the police power, the rationale relied upon 
by the Nevada Supreme Court to make this extension was simply 
a restatement of the rationale developed to permit a state to alter 
future contractual actions. The court provided no new justifica- 
tions. 
B. Public or Private Welfare? 
One of the most significant limitations on a state's ability to 
constitutionally impair contracts is the requirement that the 
impairing legislation promote the public welfare and not merely 
the welfare of one of the parties to a contract.74 Unquestionably, 
the regulation of pyramid sales contracts is an "end which is in 
fact public;" however, as previously noted, that purpose was ac- 
complished by making future contracts illegal. The provisions 
making existing contracts voidable aids only the parties to the 
contract that had succumbed to Koscot's inducements by giving 
them a simplified legislative remedy to be used in the place of 
existing judicial re me die^.^" 
It could be argued that legislation that helps even a small 
number of parties to existing contracts is an "end which is in fact 
public." Some support for this position can be found in the fact 
that the law upheld in Blaisdell significantly benefited mortga- 
gors. Nevertheless, the quantum of public interest involved in 
insuring that large numbers of individuals do not lose their homes 
and farms, and hence their very livelihood, is significantly greater 
than that involved in facilitating a few individuals to recover 
their investment without going to court. Furthermore, the statute 
upheld in Blaisdell was designed to preserve the agricultural sec- 
tor of the state's economy and not merely to provide a simplified 
remedy.7" review of post-Blaisdell decisions reveals that stat- 
utes upheld against contract clause attacks have consistently 
benefited the public generally and that any benefit accruing to 
the parties to the contract was incidental to the promotion of the 
general public welfare. Since modification of executed contrac- 
tual provisions-part of the chapter 598 scheme-is by its very 
nature concerned with past harm, only the contracting parties 
will be significantly affected, and the public interest involved 
74. Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936). 
75. See notes 10-14 and accompanying text supra. 
76. 290 U.S. a t  422-23, 437, 446. 
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when the legislature is not acting to prevent future harm is mini- 
mal. 
C. Retroactivity 
Assuming, however, that the public welfare requirement is 
met, retroactive voidability can be challenged on another basis. 
As was demonstrated earlier, the legislative history of the con- 
tract clause shows that it was intended to function much like the 
ex post facto clause, limiting the effect of legislation to acts which 
are yet to be performed.77 Furthermore, the initial Supreme Court 
decision interpreting the contract clause, Fletcher v. Peck,'%eld 
that legislation could not be retroactively applied to invalidate 
earlier state grants of land even though those grants were ob- 
tained by bribery. Thus, the retroactive voidability provisions of 
chapter 598 appear to violate a fundamental touchstone of the 
contract clause.79 
Since the present case involves a contract that is, technically 
speaking, partially executory (Koscot would have a continuing 
obligation to supply cosmetics and to pay commissions earned 
from product sales), it might be distinguished from Fletcher v. 
Peck. It is doubtful, however, that anyone would desire to con- 
tinue selling Koscot's cosmetics absent the possibility of earning 
income from position-selling-a possibility destroyed when pyra- 
mid schemes were made illegal. As a practical matter, therefore, 
the executory aspect of the contract is a phantom, and the basis 
for distinguishing Fletcher v. Peck must be deemed unavailable. 
In any event, the contested retroactive provision of chapter 598 
deals with actions and rights secured in the past, and exemplifies 
the civil application of an ex post facto-like measure in a manner 
contrary to the spirit and purpose underlying the drafting of the 
contract clause. 
D. Alternative Theories of Recovery 
Finally, the statute goes further than necessary to achieve 
the desired result of providing those who have been defrauded 
77. See note 24 and accompanying text supra. 
78. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
79. Expressing his belief that the ex post facto and contract clauses had similar 
purposes, Marshall stated that: 
This rescinding act would have the effect of an ex post facto law . . . . This 
cannot be effected in the form of an ex post facto law, or bill of attainder; why 
then is it allowable in the form of a law annulling the original grant? 
Id. at  138-39. 
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with a reliable means of recovering from their mistake~.~"ince 
chapter 598 eliminated the possibility of making money from 
future sales, and since that possibility was in fact the most signif- 
icant benefit provided by Koscot's contracts, existing contracts 
could be judicially voided on a theory of frustration of purpose. 
In addition, the court found that Koscot's operations were "noth- 
ing but a fraudulent scheme,"81 indicating that a theory of fraud- 
ulent misrepresentation pleaded in the alternative would also be 
successful. 
One conceivable justification might be presented to 
overcome these problems with the court's decision: the retroac- 
tive application of chapter 598 simply allows the parties to do in 
one step what would normally take two. As previously mentioned, 
existing contracts similar to Koscot's can be rescinded on a frus- 
tration of purpose theory, since future pyramid contracts are pro- 
hibited. As a result, the provision making existing contracts void- 
able, as a practical matter, does no incremental damage to the 
sanctity of contracts and only makes it possible to omit an unnec- 
essary and perfunctory trip to the courthouse. 
If it were possible to limit the holding of the case to those 
situations where contemporaneous legislation prohibiting future 
conduct would invariably result in the invalidation of existing 
contracts because of fraud or frustration of purpose, such an argu- 
ment would be supportable. A judicial determination that invali- 
dation would inevitably occur in every imaginable case, however, 
simply may not be possible. For example, in the pyramid sales 
area, a few pyramid sales schemes, primarily found in the Mid- 
west, have been found to be legitimate marketing methods in that 
the pyramiding is controlled and commissions from product sales 
do in fact provide the fundamental source of income." In such 
cases, a frustration of purpose claim might not be supportable; 
the contract would thus be immune from rescission, and a statute 
making existing contracts voidable would cause some incremen- 
tal harm to the interests that the contract clause was designed to 
protect. Nevertheless, since most of the pyramid schemes operat- 
ing in the western states are clearly "nothing but a fraudulent 
scheme," it is conceivable that a court reviewing a statute chal- 
80. See note 51 and accompanying text supra. 
81. 530 P.2d a t  112. 
82. See Multi-Level, supra note 4, a t  358, 390-93, where the author states that con- 
trolling the abuses of pyramid schemes by intelligent legislation would be a practical 
alternative to outlawing such plans altogether, because a few pyramid plans are not 
fraudulent. 
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lenged under the contract clause could accurately determine that 
all pyramid contracts in a specific jurisdiction would ultimately 
be invalidated in any event. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Absent a determination, however, that all contracts embody- 
ing a pyramid sales scheme would ultimately be voided under 
traditional contract principles, the instant case must necessarily 
be viewed as stretching the police power rationale beyond its 
current limitations. That extension can only be justified if one is 
prepared to do what the court in the present case refused or failed 
to do expressly. Sufficient public interest would have to be found 
in the fact that only a few individuals who are parties to existing 
contracts are benefited. The pervasive idea that legislatures are 
to enact laws which cover future conduct only would have to be 
rebutted,83 and the legislative history of the contract clause would 
have to be rewritten. Further, one would need to rationalize the 
fact that the retroactive provisions of chapter 598 or statutes like 
it do little to promote the general welfare and are not necessary 
to provide defrauded parties with an adequate remedy. 
The right of contract is a constitutionally-guaranteed right. 
While the state necessarily has power in certain circumstances to 
modify contractual terms to protect the public, this power should 
be kept in check so as not to seriously impair a doctrine of long- 
standing constitutional authority. In particular, the constitu- 
tional limits placed upon the legislature's power to impair con- 
tractual obligations ought not to be diluted beyond the present 
limits which permit only the reasonable prohibition or alteration 
of contractual duties to be performed in the future. 
-- - 
83. See generally Smead, T h e  Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Princi- 
ple of Jurisprudence, 20 M I N N .  L. REV. 775, 776-94 (1936). 
